In relation to the milk futures which are available on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, it is my understanding that the most popular contract relates to milk itself. However, one has to be conscious that the milk price in the United States is very largely determined by the cheese price, since that is the dominant manufactured product and the liquid milk price is based on the manufacturing price plus various fixed differentials which are specific to various regions in the United States (the Federal Milk Marketing Orders). The problem about the US cheese price is that the market on the Chicago Mercantile exchange is very thin, dominated by two or three operators who consistently "trade against interest". In this it is very similar to its predecessor the Green Bay Exchange, which was the subject of a weighty academic investigation into market manipulation.
In the European Union the price was relatively stable up to 2006, being dominated by the structures of the Common Agricultural Policy. In 2007 prices took off spectacularly as a result of similar movements on the world market. As a result all milk subsidies are now set at zero and intervention prices became less relevant. The previous stability brought about by the structural surplus of milk in a support framework meant that there was no volatility in the market and therefore there was no scope for developing hedging instruments to manage risk.
Even in the present situation where prices have become much more volatile, the market is still dominated by the influence of the EU milk quota system. A good example of the way in which relaxation of the milk quota system could lead to significant increases in output is shown by recent developments in the management of the system in France. In the past, the French authorities managed the EU quota system in a very conservative way. On an EU Commission chart the French system was rated even more conservative than the Irish system of "ring fencing".
The apparent object of the French system was to maintain milk production in regions of France which were less suited to milk production but where it was an integral part of the traditional structure of the countryside. In addition, because France accounted for nearly a quarter of European milk production, restraint in France was likely keep up prices in Europe as a whole and hence also in France. As a result, the French authorities were quite slow even in handing out the increase of half percent in the quota to which the French farmers were entitled in 2006 2007 and 2008. However, during the course of 2007 became obvious that, possibly as a result of the introduction of decoupling, the higher cost regions in France were going to fall significantly behind their quotas and as a result milk production in France would be well below quota at a time of unprecedentedly high milk prices. The situation must have given rise to some irritation amongst farmers in the regions of France more suited to milk production, who saw themselves missing out on a glorious opportunity of producing more milk at very high prices. As a result the French authorities allowed farmers to produce over the quarter by a certain percentage. This percentage was set at 4% in June, 10 per cent in September and 15% in December. The regions of Brittany, Normandy and the surrounding areas responded quickly to this possibility with very dramatic increases in production. As a result it is very possible that France will come close to filling its milk quota in the year ending March 2008.
I would conclude from this case history that the European Union milk market is still very much subject to administrative market management and until this process is completed it will be difficult to manage on the basis of hedging instruments.